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Abstract. Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) are essential to
combat security threats in network environments. These systems monitor
and detect malicious behavior to provide automated methods of identifying and dealing with attacks or security breaches in a network. Machine
learning is a promising approach in the development of effective NIDS.
One of the problems faced in the development of such systems is that the
datasets used in the construction of classifiers are typically imbalanced.
This is because the classification categories do not have relatively equal
representation in the datasets. This study investigates a two-stage classifier approach to NIDS based on imbalanced intrusion detection datasets
by separating the training and detection of minority and majority intrusion classes. The purpose of this is to allow flexibility in the classification
process, for example, two different classifiers can be used for detecting
minority and majority classes respectively. In this paper, we performed
experiments using the random forests classifier and the contemporary
UNSW-NB15 dataset was used to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
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Introduction

For many people, the Internet has become a ubiquitous part of daily life and numerous online services and applications are used everyday. At the same time, the
threat of cyber attacks is increasing and cyber security experts have undertaken
extensive studies on methods of combating such security threats. Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) are potential automated solutions for protecting
online environments [17]. While the most effective method for the development
of NIDS remains a challenging and open question, machine learning is seen as a
very promising approach as these techniques can perform real-time automated
detection of potential threats [2, 17].
Misuse detection and anomaly detection are two major approaches adopted
in NIDS. Misuse detection focuses on identifying the signatures or patterns of
malicious records. When a new record is received, a misuse detection system

compares it with existing signatures to classify it as normal or malicious activity. One of the major problems of misuse detection is that it performs poorly
against novel attacks, since the system cannot match it with signatures that
have previously been classified as malicious activity [7, 17]. On the other hand,
anomaly detection attempts to identify behaviors that differ significantly from
regular network activity. Thus, accurate behavior profiles of normal behavior
are important in such systems [7]. While anomaly detection systems outperform
misuse detection systems when it comes to detecting novel attacks, they typically produce high false alarm rates, which is undesirable and researchers often
attempt to reduce the number of false alarms [6].
Another problem faced in the development of NIDS based on machine learning, is that the datasets used in the construction of classifiers are typically extremely imbalanced. A dataset in which the classification categories are not
approximately equally represented is considered to be imbalanced [3, 4]. The
characteristic representation of malicious activity in datasets that are used for
intrusion detection is usually extremely imbalanced, as certain attacks occur
more often than others. The problem that this creates is that some machine
learning intrusion detection approaches may perform well at the task of detecting frequent attacks, but are much less effective when it comes to the detection
of infrequent attacks, due to the lack of sufficient training data for infrequent
attacks [12].
This paper investigates the use of a two-stage approach to the development of
NIDS based on imbalanced intrusion detection datasets. The underlying notion
behind this approach is to filter the dataset into majority and minority malicious
activity classes, and to apply classification algorithm on them separately to produce different models for detection. The purpose of this is to improve the overall
detection rate of minority classes and to reduce the error rate. The proposed
approach is flexible in that a different classifier can be used for each stage of the
NIDS. This study examines the two-stage approach using the random forests
classifier and also evaluates the effectiveness of the proposed approach on the
contemporary UNSW-NB15 dataset.

Our Contributions. In this study we examine an innovative two-stage classifier
approach to NIDS. The main purpose of this approach is to be able to handle
imbalanced intrusion detection datasets, by separating the intrusion detection
data into majority and minority classes, and training two separate classifiers for
each category respectively. In this manner, different classifiers can be used to
detect the majority and minority classes, with the overall aim of improving the
detection rate, especially of minority classes and to reduce the error rate. While
this paper examines the two-stage classifier approach using the random forests
classifier, note that different classifiers can be used for each of the two-stages.

2

Background

This section introduces related work on machine learning and the various techniques for dealing with imbalanced intrusion detection datasets. In addition, it
also provides a background description of different datasets that are typically
used for the development of NIDS.
2.1

Related Work

Over the years, researchers have proposed a variety of different machine learning
approaches for intrusion detection, including artificial neural networks, Bayesian
networks, support vector machines, etc. [2]. The random forests classifier is an
approach that combines decision trees and ensemble learning into an ensemble
classifier that consists of multiple decision trees, where each tree grows to the
largest possible extent without pruning [1]. The advantages of using random
forests include its resistance to over-fitting, and its low number of control and
model parameters [2].
Zhang et al. [22] proposed a random forests based NIDS for both misuse
detection and anomaly detection. For misuse detection, their approach applies
sampling techniques and feature selection algorithms to improve the overall detection performance. Conversely for anomaly detection, an unsupervised outlier
detection approach was adopted by first building patterns of network services,
then using this to determine anomalies in network traffic.
Intrusion detection datasets are typically imbalanced, as some attacks occur
at higher frequencies compared with others. The random forests algorithm attempts to minimize the overall classification errors by lowering the error rate
on majority classes while increasing the error rate on minority classes [1, 22].
Therefore, imbalanced datasets will adversely affect the overall performance of
accurately classifying minority classes. One of the approaches for dealing with
imbalance datasets and to improve the detection rate of minority intrusions, is
to over-sample minority intrusions or to down-sample majority intrusions, or to
implement both methods [4].
Chawla et al. [3] proposed a method for over-sampling the minority classes
by creating synthetic minority classes to achieve better classifier performance
in imbalanced datasets. They named this method the Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique (SMOTE) and showed its improved performance when used
in conjunction with down-sampled majority classes using C4.5, Ripper and a
Naı̈ve Bayes classifier. The SMOTE method has also been used in other work
on machine learning classification models for intrusion detection [12, 13, 19].
Feature selection is an important step in building NIDS, as only certain features may be essential to distinguish intrusions from normal activity. Unessential
features may increase the computation cost and error rate [22]. While in many
NIDS methods the features are designed by security experts, it would be ideal to
have an automated approach to selecting important features. Information gain
can be used as a criterion for feature selection, where features with low infor-

mation gain can be eliminated because they have relatively small relevance on
classification [15].
The following is a formal definition of information gain [15]:
Definition 1. Let X and Y be discrete variables representing sample attributes
(x1 , x2 , ..., xm ) and class attributes (y1 , y2 , ..., yn ), respectively. Then, the information gain, IG, of a given attribute X regarding a class attribute Y is calculated
as:
IG(Y, X) = Entrophy(Y ) − Entrophy(Y |X)
where
∑n
– Entrophy(Y ) = − i=1 P (Y = yi )log2 P (Y = yi ), where P (Y = yi ) is the
probability that yi occurs,
∑m and
– Entrophy(Y |X) = − i=1 P (X = xj )Entrophy(Y |X = xj ).
2.2

Network Intrusion Detection Datasets

Network intrusion detection datasets are vital for evaluating the effectiveness of
NIDS. It has been contended that the commonly used KDD98, KDD CUP99
and NSL KDD benchmark datasets for intrusion detection were generated more
than a decade ago, and many studies have highlighted flaws in these datasets
[8, 18]. Furthermore, it has been argued that these datasets no longer reflect the
current network threat environment. The UNSW-NB15 dataset was created as
a hybrid of real modern normal and contemporary synthesized attack activities
of network traffic [10]. As such, this modern dataset was used in this study for
evaluating the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
Table 1 shows the characteristics of a part of the UNSW-NB15 data set,
where the training and testing sets have been divided into an approximately
60% to 40% ratio. There were no redundant records among the training and
testing set [11]. It can clearly be seen that the different categories are unequally
represented in the dataset. For example, the analysis, backdoor, shellcode and
worms categories are minority classes that collectively only make up < 3% of the
sets. This imbalance creates problems for classifiers and results in poor detection
performance of these minority classes.

3

Proposed Approach

The method proposed in this study adopts a two-stage classification approach
for majority and minority classes. From Table 1, it can be seen that majority
classes like normal, exploits, generic, etc. occur frequently and there is an abundance of such training samples. On the other hand, minority classes like analysis,
backdoor, shellcode and worms only make up less than 3% of the overall dataset.
This imbalance typically adversely affects classifier performance, and the purpose of the proposed approach is to increase the performance of minority class
detection.

Table 1. Categories and their distribution in part of the UNSW-NB15 dataset [11].

Category
Training Set Testing Set
Normal
56,000
37,000
Analysis
2,000
677
Backdoor
1,746
583
DoS
12,264
4,089
Exploits
33,393
11,132
Fuzzers
18,184
6,062
Generic
40,000
18,871
Reconnaissance
10,491
3,496
Shellcode
1,133
378
Worms
130
44
Total Records
175,341
82,332

An overview of dividing the dataset into majority and minority classes for
the two stages is depicted in Fig. 1. During the first stage, majority classes,
which occupy a major proportion of a training set, are classified as “others” and
a model is trained to identify the minority classes using a classifier, the random
forests approach was used in this study. In the second stage, the minority classes
are removed and another model is trained to identify the majority classes. This
results in two different intrusion detection models for identifying the minority
and majority classes respectively. While this study uses the random forests classifier for both stages, other classifiers can also be used. In fact, it is possible to
use different classifiers for each of the stages.

Fig. 1. Overview of the two-stage classification approach.

Fig. 2 shows a more detailed depiction of the processes involved in the proposed approach. The processes are divided into a training phase and a detection
phase. It can be seen that the training phases is divided into two stages for
the majority and minority classes respectively. Stage 1 involves the training of
all the minority classes that are extracted from the full training set, while the
majority classes are grouped together into another category for training in the
second stage.

Fig. 2. Processes in the proposed approach.

3.1

Training Phase

In stage 1, after extracting the minority classes, feature selection is performed
using the information gain method that was previously defined in Definition 1,
and all categorical features are then converted into binary features using one-hot
encoding to produce a set of numeric values. The SMOTE method is then used
to over-sample the minority classes. The purpose of over-sampling the minority
classes is to alleviate the imbalance in the minority classes. From Table 1, it can
be seen that even though classes like analysis, backdoor, shellcode and worms
are grouped into minority classes, samples for the worms category are extremely
under represented. Hence, over-sampling attempts to bring this closer to the
other categories.
The resulting set is then used for the training, in which optimal hyperparameters are found for the random forests algorithm. Three hyper-parameters
are considered for fine tuning the model, namely, the maximum depth of a tree in
the forest, the number of trees and the number of features considered when looking for the best split. During the training phase, the random forests algorithm
calculates the out-of-bag (oob) error. Since the oob error rate can be taken as an
indication of whether the model is well trained, a random search is performed
to find the lowest oob error rate, and the corresponding hyper-parameters are
obtained from this.
Stage 2 undergoes a relatively similar process to obtain a trained model
for identifying the majority classes. Only the majority classes are used in the
training set, the minority classes are removed, since this was handled in stage
1. Down-sampling is performed to balance the majority classes using a random
selection method. This is done for the same reason as over-sampling the minority
classes. The distribution of network traffic within the majority classes in itself
is unbalances, hence, down-sampling is performed to balance certain categories.
Information gain is again used for feature selection, followed by one-hot encoding.
This is subsequently used for training, and the optimal hyper-parameters search
is performed for stage 2 random forest optimization.
It should be noted that while the random forests approach was used for both
stages in this study, the proposed approach is flexible in that other classifiers
can also be used for each stage respectively. For example, other classifiers like
decision tree approach, logistic regression, artificial neural network, etc. can also
be used and may potentially result in better performance.
3.2

Detection Phase

During the next phase of the proposed approach, which is the detection phase,
network data is input into the system. When used for intrusion detection, the
model for identifying minority classes is used first to determine whether an activity is malicious. If it is not identified as one of the minority classes, the second
model is then applied to identify whether the activity is a majority intrusion.
Otherwise, it is determined to be normal network traffic.

4

Results and Discussion

To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, an experiment was performed on the UNSW-NB15 dataset. The UNSW-NB15 training dataset was
used to train the two intrusion detection models, and the full testing dataset
was used to evaluate the performance of the proposed approach.
Table 2 shows results of the minimum oob error (MoE) rates and their corresponding hyper-parameters for the respective stages. In the table, the hyperparameters are the maximum depth (MD), which refers to the maximum depth
of a tree in the forest, the number of trees (NoT), and the number of features
(NoF) for best split after one-hot encoding. The total number of features (TNoF)
refers to the number of features remaining after one-hot encoding and feature
selection.
Table 2. Minimum oob error rates and the corresponding hyper-parameters.

MoE MD NoT NoF TNoF
Stage 1 0.119 29 179 109 138
Stage 2 0.167 23 248 80
170

A comparison of the proposed approach with the five different techniques
(i.e. Decision Tree (DT), Logistic Regression (LR), Naı̈ve Bayes (NB), Artificial Neural Network (ANN) and Expectation-Maximization (EM) clustering) as
presented in Moustafa and Slay [11] is shown in Table 3. From the table, it can
be seen that the resulting accuracy of the proposed approach is higher than
the other techniques, while the False Alarm Rate (FAR) is lower. This suggests
that the overall performance of the proposed approach is better than most of
the other techniques and comparable with the DT technique. Fig. 3 shows the
confusion matrix depicting the performance results of the proposed approach for
the individual categories.
Table 3. Comparison with the different techniques from [11].

Technique
Accuracy (%) FAR (%)
DT [20]
85.56
15.78
LR [21]
83.15
18.48
NB [16]
82.07
18.56
ANN [21]
81.34
21.13
EM clustering [14]
78.47
23.79
Proposed Approach
85.78
15.64

Fig. 3. Confusion matrix.

While the attacks represented in the minority classes are typically infrequent,
they are nevertheless potentially dangerous. However, most of these attacks (i.e.
analysis, shellcode and worms) could not be detected using the NB and EM clustering approaches as reported in Moustafa and Slay [9]. Only backdoor attacks
could be detected by the NB approach with a low accuracy of 20%.
In other recent work, these attacks could be detected at low rates using a
random forests with stratified cross-validation method [5]. Fig. 4 and 5 provide
a comparison of the recall and precision performances, respectively, between the
results reported in Janarthanan and Zargari [5] and the proposed approach.
It can be seen from Fig. 4 that the recall results of the proposed two-stage
approach performs better in comparison. However, the precision performance in
Fig. 5 is lower. Nevertheless, for minority classes a higher recall rate is more
important than precision, because these attacks are potentially more dangerous
than other attacks. Therefore, higher recall values prevent these attacks from
escaping detection.
Upon closer inspection of the overall results, it was found that most of the
misclassification was to do with fuzzing activity. Table 4 provides the rate of
normal traffic that was misclassified as malicious activity. It can be seen from
the table at a large portion of the misclassification are for fuzzers. Fuzzers are
attacks where the attacker attempts to discover security loopholes in a pro-

Fig. 4. Comparison of minority classes recall performance.

Fig. 5. Comparison of minority classes precision performance.

gram, operating system or network [11]. They are not necessarily dangerous in
themselves when compared with other attacks. Fuzzing activity has to do with
inputting lots of random data. As such, they do not have a fixed pattern and
are more difficult to distinguish from normal network traffic. Nevertheless, as
future work it would be ideal to be able to reduce the misclassification rate of
this category of activity.
Table 4. Normal activity misclassified as malicious.

Categories
Misclassification (%)
Analysis
3.4
Backdoor
0.1
DoS
0.4
Exploits
0.9
Fuzzers
23.2
Generic
0.0
Reconnaissance
0.0
Shellcode
1.5
Worms
0.0

It should be noted that even though this study uses the random forests
approach for both stages of the proposed approach, each stage can potentially
use a different classification technique. For example, for the minority classifier,
other techniques like a decision tree approach, logistic regression, or artificial
neural network can be used to potentially increase the detection precision. As
such, this will the subject of future work.

5

Conclusion

This study has demonstrated a two-stage classifier approach to NIDS based on
imbalanced intrusion detection datasets. The purpose is to address the problem faced in the development of NIDS, which is that the datasets used in the
construction of classifiers are typically imbalanced. The primary notion is to
separate the training and detection of minority and majority intrusion classes
to improve the overall detection rate of minority classes and to reduce the error rate. The effectiveness of the proposed approach was evaluated using the
contemporary UNSW-NB15 dataset and was shown to produce favorable results
when compared with other approaches. Future work will focus on examining the
proposed approach with other classifiers in the two-stages.
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